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Public-Sector Labor in the Age of Obama†
JOSEPH E. SLATER

*

INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to be part of this symposium on labor in the “age of Obama,” and
I am especially pleased to discuss the public sector. For too long, scholars have
viewed public-sector labor relations as something of a boutique or specialty
subject. The many recent books and articles that describe (and generally decry) the
state of private-sector labor law and labor relations hardly mention the public
sector.1 Yet public-sector unions are one of the labor movement’s biggest success
stories. For some time, the union density rate in the public sector has been around
40%, while the private-sector rate is now less than 7%.2 Indeed, as of 2010, in the
United States more government employees were union members than private-sector
employees.3 In short, “the public sector” is over half of “labor” in the age of
Obama, and public-sector unions have achieved many of labor’s most significant
accomplishments in the past few decades. Scholars should take heed.
On the other hand, public-sector unions are now facing extraordinary
difficulties. In the initial draft of this Article, before the November 2010 elections, I
played with the “best of times, worst of times” cliché. By early 2011 it became
clear that public-sector unions are under attacks unprecedented in modern times.
Since public-sector unions did not even begin to win the right to bargain

† Copyright © 2012 Joseph E. Slater.
* Eugene N. Balk Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law.
I am grateful to the participants in this Symposium, especially Steve Befort, for their
valuable comments. I also thank the University of Toledo College of Law and Eugene N.
Balk Professorship for their financial support. Finally, Marissa Licatta and Margaret
Reynolds provided very helpful research assistance.
Portions of Part I of this Article were previously published in JOSEPH E. SLATER,
AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, THE ASSAULT ON PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: REAL HARMS AND IMAGINARY BENEFITS (2011), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Slater_Collective_Bargaining.pdf.
1. See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELFREGULATION TO CO-REGULATION (2010); CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK:
RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2005); Charles B. Craver,
The National Labor Relations Act at 75: In Need of a Heart Transplant, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 311 (2010); Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of Private
Sector Unionism: What Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133 (2007); James
Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 518 (2004); Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375,
380–89 (2007).
2. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 3. Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and
Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm. In 2010, 36.2% of public employees were
members of unions, and 40.0% were covered by union contracts. Id.
3. In 2010, 7.6 million public workers and 7.1 million private-sector workers were
union members. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF
LAB. STAT. (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
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collectively until the 1960s, this may not be literally the worst of times for them, 4
but right now the balance seems closer to “worst” than “best.” The economic crisis
has caused significant cuts in public employment. By the fall of 2010, the number
of workers employed by local governments had dropped to its lowest level since
October 2006, and the drop in local government employment from August to
September 2010 was the biggest one-month decline since 1982.5 These trends are
projected to continue or even worsen through 2011.6 More broadly, the recession
has provided an opportunity for some not only to argue that public workers are
overcompensated, but also to blame various economic and budget woes on public
sector unions and their right to bargain collectively.
Of course, describing “public-sector labor” in this or any other era is a
challenge. Public employment includes a wide variety of jobs and types of
employers: police officers in Virginia, grade school teachers in Missouri, security
screeners for the Transportation Safety Administration, municipal janitors in
California, and white-collar professionals in Ohio state agencies. Also,
public-sector labor law is generally set by state and local laws, which vary
significantly. Some states do not grant public workers the right to bargain
collectively at all; some allow only a few types of public workers to bargain
collectively; others allow collective bargaining generally but do not allow strikes;
and some allow bargaining and strikes (for most public workers). 7 Thus, public
school teachers in Virginia cannot bargain collectively or strike; 8 teachers in
Michigan can bargain collectively but cannot legally strike; 9 and teachers in
Pennsylvania can both bargain collectively and strike. 10 Statutes that allow
bargaining but not strikes (the most common approach)11 use varying processes for
resolving bargaining impasses, including fact finding and mediation, and usually,

4. For a discussion of the era before public workers began to win the right to bargain
collectively, see generally JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900–1962 (2004).
5. “Local governments employed 14.2 million, or 76,000 fewer people [in September]
than in August, the biggest one-month decline since July 1982 . . . . Of the jobs cut, 50,000
were in education.” Simone Baribeau & Ashley Lutz, Local Government Employment in
U.S.
Falls
to
Lowest
Since
2006,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
8,
2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-08/local-government-employment-in-u-s-falls-tolowest-since-2006.html.
6. “‘Unfortunately, the government sector is likely to see heavy job cuts again in
2011 . . . ,’ [said John Challenger, the chief executive officer of an outplacement firm that
has studied the issue]. ‘In fact, the sector could see an increase in job cuts in 2011 . . . .’”
Reductions-in-Force: Despite Drop, More Government Job Cuts Ahead, 49 Gov’t Empl.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 39 (Jan. 11, 2011).
7. See RICHARD C. KEARNEY WITH DAVID G. CARNEVALE, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 60–61, 236–37 (3d ed. 2001).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See generally MARTIN H. MALIN, ANN C. HODGES & JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2011) (sections discussing strikes and
other aspects of collective bargaining); KEARNEY WITH CARNEVALE, supra note 7, at 236–37,
264–65.
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but not always, end in some form of binding “interest arbitration.” 12 Other legal
rules vary significantly across jurisdictions, notably on scope of bargaining (often
narrower than in the private sector) and coverage of employees (some public-sector
laws cover supervisors).13
Partly because they are subject to local laws, and partly because their employers
are elected officials, public-sector unions are often very vulnerable to shifting
political winds. While the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) seems almost
immune to amendment,14 public-sector unions frequently win and lose rights
through legislative and executive actions.15 The fundamental question of whether
some, or even any, public employees should even have a right to bargain
collectively remains contested, even though the vast majority of states have
adopted collective bargaining rights for some or most public workers.16 The
economic crisis that began in 2008 has significantly intensified these debates.
Events are unfolding at a rapid pace. From the fall of 2010, when I first presented
this Article, to the spring of 2011, a number of states have made significant
changes in their public-sector laws, some of which have been quite radical. 17
This Article will focus on four issues involving public-sector labor in the age of
Obama—issues that are significant on their own and also relate to questions of the
proper nature and extent of collective bargaining in the public sector. The first two
issues have had broad impact across the country; the second two focus on legal
issues for discrete sets of workers that also raise broad issues about all public-sector
labor relations.
Part I discusses the political attacks on public-sector unions, which have
escalated during the economic crisis and resulted in the consideration and passage
of new laws. It describes these laws and focuses on debates over public employee
compensation, both pay and pensions. Part II covers certain bargaining and legal
issues created by the economic crisis: the impact on interest arbitrations, the use of
furloughs by public employers, and cases challenging unilateral employer actions
under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Part III concerns acts (or
potential acts) by the federal government that could have both great practical and
symbolic significance: first, the continuing battle over whether employees of the
Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) should have collective bargaining

12. See KEARNEY WITH CARNEVAL, supra note 7, at 264–65.
13. MALIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 457–554 (scope of bargaining); id. at 359–412
(coverage of employees); KEARNEY WITH CARNEVAL, supra note 7.
14. In the first half of the Obama administration, a democratic president with a Congress
featuring significant democratic majorities in the House and Senate was unable to pass the
Employee Free Choice Act, which would have amended the NLRA. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong.
(2009). The last major amendment to the NLRA, the Landrum-Griffin Act, was enacted over
fifty years ago. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2006)).
15. See infra Part I.D.
16. For example, in the past decade, Indiana, Arizona, and Kentucky had governors
issue executive orders permitting certain public employees to bargain collectively, only to
have the next governor repeal this order. MALIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 288–89; see also
infra Part III (for a discussion regarding federal employees).
17. See infra Part I.D.
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rights, and second, a proposed statute that would grant all police and firefighters
collective bargaining rights. Finally, Part IV will describe a set of cases from
Missouri interpreting its state constitutional requirement that employees have “the
right to bargain collectively,” which focus on the basic question of what exactly
“collective bargaining” means.
I. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, POLITICAL ATTACKS ON PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS, AND
NEW LAWS
A. Of Pensions and Politics
In the best of times, the fortunes of public workers and their unions are subject
to political shifts. Sympathetic public officials can expand their legal rights;
unsympathetic officials can contract them. Public sympathy can put pressure on
elected officials (including the employers of union members) in a variety of
contexts, including contract negotiations, where collective bargaining is allowed,
and less formal arrangements, where it is not. Similarly, public skepticism of
government employees and their unions can hurt labor in negotiations, increase
pressure to cut taxes and privatize public services, and affect compensation and
other issues not subject to collective negotiation (for example, state-run pension
plans).
These are not the best of times. The severity of the economic downturn that
began in the summer of 2008 needs no detailed recounting here. The current
recession has prompted a political maelstrom around public employees and their
unions. Critics have claimed that these workers are overcompensated and that their
pension plans are economically unsustainable. 18 With unemployment high, the
relatively greater job security of public workers—real and/or perceived—is likely
also a source of friction.
Thus, for example, a Wall Street Journal editorial last spring made the
remarkable claim that “America’s most privileged class are public union
workers.”19 The New Republic titled an article “Why Public Employees Are the
New Welfare Queens.”20 A Politico article explained:
Spurred by state budget crunches and an angry public mood,
Republican and some Democratic leaders are focusing with increasing
intensity on public workers and the unions that represent them, casting

18. Amy Traub, Dir. of Research, Drum Major Inst. for Pub. Policy, Address at the
AFL-CIO’s Annual State Legislative Issues Conference: Countering Anti-Public Worker
Sentiment (July 24, 2010), available at http://www.drummajorinstitute.org/library/article.
php?ID=7523 (describing and criticizing the attacks).
19. Editorial, The Government Pay Boom, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2010, at A18
(emphasis omitted). One might wonder if the authors of this editorial, associated as they are
with Wall Street, might actually be aware of a class of Americans even more privileged than,
say, the (unionized) janitorial staff at my (public) university.
20. Jonathan Cohn, Why Public Employees Are the New Welfare Queens, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 8, 2010, http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/76884/why-your-firemanhas-better-pension-you.
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them as overpaid obstacles to good government and demanding cuts in
their often-generous benefits. . . .
“We have a new privileged class in America,” said Indiana Gov.
Mitch Daniels, who rescinded state workers’ collective bargaining
power on his first day in office in 2006. “We used to think of
government workers as underpaid public servants. Now they are better
paid than the people who pay their salaries.” 21
Tim Pawlenty, governor of Minnesota, made the politics of the issue explicit: “If
you inform the public and workers in the private sector about the inflated benefits
and compensation packages of public employees, and then you remind the
taxpayers that they’re footing the bill for that—they get on the reform train pretty
quickly.”22 Mort Zuckerman, editor of U.S. News & World Report, was even more
direct when he stated that we must escape from “public sector unions’ stranglehold
on state and local governments . . . or it will crush us.” 23 Paul Gigot of the Wall
Street Journal posited “a showdown looming across the country between taxpayers
and public employee unions over pay and pensions.”24 Taking what in other times
might have been considered a politically risky or at least an ironic stance, former
Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney asked, “Why should taxpayers pay for health
care for public employees that we don’t have ourselves?”25 The November 2010
election results, along with an economy that is still struggling, have intensified the
mood. In the same week, my local paper reported that incoming Ohio governor
John Kasich “wants to do away with binding arbitration for police and fire
unions . . . and, as much as possible, dismantle the state’s 1983 collective
bargaining law” for public employees,26 and the New York Times featured an article
titled “Strained States Turning to Laws to Curb Unions.” 27 On February 9, 2011, a
bill was introduced in the Ohio Senate that would have, among other things:
eliminated or severely limited collective bargaining for state workers; made all
public-sector strikes illegal; greatly weakened binding interest arbitration rules for
police and firefighters (who cannot currently strike); and removed, or mostly
removed, health insurance from the scope of mandatory bargaining. 28 Along the
same lines, the incoming governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, announced that he
will seek to eliminate almost all collective bargaining rights of state and local

21. Ben Smith & Maggie Haberman, Pols Turn on Labor Unions, POLITICO, June 6,
2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/38183.html.
22. Id.
23. Amy Traub, War on Public Workers, THE NATION, July 5, 2010, at 5.
24. Id.
25. Jeff Crosby, Public Sector, Public Good, AFL-CIO NOW BLOG, Apr. 22, 2010,
http://blog.aflcio.org/2010/04/22/public-sector-public-good/#more-28473.
26. Jennifer Feehan, Kasich Stand Worries Union; Attack on Bargaining Law Called
‘Teachable Moment,’ THE BLADE (Toledo, OH), Dec. 31, 2010, at B1.
27. Steven Greenhouse, Strained States Turning to Laws to Curb Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 2011, at A1.
28. See Ignazio Messina, Shift of Control Gives GOP Votes to Greatly Alter Ohio’s
Labor Law; Collective Bargaining for State Workers Among Issues, THE BLADE (Toledo,
OH), Feb. 11, 2011, at A1 (discussing Senate Bill 5).
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public workers.29 This is shocking not only because the bill is so radical, but also
because Wisconsin adopted, around fifty years ago, the first public-sector collective
bargaining law in the country.30
Much of the real and perceived financial problems in this area involve pension
plans. Notably, public-sector pension benefits and rules in most states are not set
through collective bargaining, but rather through statute and regulation. 31 Also,
while some state plans have significant underfunding problems, in the aggregate,
public-sector pension plans currently account for a total of 3.8% of state and local
spending, which does not seem obviously out of balance. 32 Still, the problem is
real, at least in a number of places. Causes range from stock market declines, to
underfunding due to questionable actuarial assumptions and political pressure to
divert funds to other projects, to some overgenerous benefit formulas. 33
Certainly the stock market declines in recent years contributed to significant
underfunding in a number of places. This, in turn, put additional strains on
already-weakened public budgets. The Politico piece noted:
A recent study from the Pew Center on the States found that states
are short $1 trillion toward the $3.35 trillion in pension, health care and
other retirement benefits states have promised their current and retired
workers, the product of a combination of political decisions and the
recent recession.
But the immediate cause of the new spotlight on public sector
unions is the collapse in tax revenues that came with the 2008 Wall

29. Mary Spicuzza & Clay Barbour, Walker: We Must Cut Power of Unions; Democrats
and Public Workers Decry His Proposal to Eliminate Collective Bargaining, WIS. ST. J.,
Feb. 11, 2011, at A1.
30. See SLATER, supra note 4, at 158–93.
31. See Gerald W. McEntee, Editorial, Don’t Blame Public Pensions; Opposing View,
USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 2011, at 9A (public-employee pension systems “predated public
employee bargaining rights, and few plans are subject to the bargaining process today”). For
example, in Ohio, pension benefits are set by statute and pension rules and benefits are not
negotiable by unions. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §145.01-95 (LexisNexis 2007) (statute setting
pension rules and benefits for public employees); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.10
(LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (provisions of laws pertaining to, inter alia, the retirement of public
employees prevail over any provisions in a collective bargaining agreement).
32. ALICIA H. MUNNELL, JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY & LAURA QUINBY, CTR. FOR RET.
RESEARCH, NO. 13, THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC PENSIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL BUDGETS 1
(2010).
33. See David Lewin, Thomas Kochan, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Teresa Ghilarducci,
Harry Katz, Jeff Keefe, Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Craig Olson, Saul Rubinstein & Christian
Weller, Getting It Right: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications from Research on
Public-Sector Unionism and Collective Bargaining 11–12 (Emp’t Policy Research Network,
Labor and Emp’t Relations Ass’n Working Paper Series, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792942; Florence Olsen, Retirement: Assumptions About
Investment Returns Set Public Pensions Apart, NASRA Says, 48 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 401 (Apr. 6, 2010).
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Street crash, something that union leaders bitterly note is not their
fault.34
California’s public employee pensions are perhaps in the worst condition. A
recent study from the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, using
economic assumptions the authors felt were more reliable than the officially
approved standards the plan was using, found that prior to the 2008/2009 recession,
the three major public-sector pension plans for the state had a combined funding
shortfall of $425.2 billion.35 Then, between June 2008 and June 2009, these three
pension funds lost a combined $109.7 billion, putting their ability to meet future
obligations at risk.36 While this study contained recommendations to restore sound
economic footing, the California pension problem has also inspired critiques less
measured and more willing to blame unions—in books with titles like Plunder!:
How Public Employee Unions Are Raiding Treasuries, Controlling Our Lives and
Bankrupting the Nation, for example.37
In some cases, these problems have been exaggerated. A coalition of ten
organizations representing state and local government employers issued a fact sheet
on January 26, 2011, stating that state and local government pension funds on the
whole “are not in crisis.”38 It concluded that “[m]ost state and local government
employee retirement systems have substantial assets to weather the economic
crisis; those that are underfunded are taking steps to strengthen funding.”39 Some
have disputed claims, such as those made by the Stanford Institute for Economic
Policy Research, that public pension fund managers make overly optimistic
assumptions about investment returns. 40 Another independent study explains that
the extent of public pension liabilities varies widely among the states
and local governments. Some pension plans are fully funded, while
others have seen their funding levels drop below 80 percent. In most
cases, pension funding shortfalls are the result of the cyclical nature of
the economy, which was particularly severe in the 2008–2009 period.
In a minority of cases, unfunded liabilities can be directly traced to the

34. Smith & Haberman, supra note 21.
35. See HOWARD BORNSTEIN, STAN MARKUZE, CAMERON PERCY, LISHA WANG &
MORITZ ZANDER, STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, GOING FOR BROKE:
REFORMING CALIFORNIA’S PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION SYSTEMS (2010), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgibin/siepr/?q=/system/files/shared/GoingforBroke_pb
.pdf.
36. Id.
37. STEVEN GREENHUT, PLUNDER!: HOW PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS ARE RAIDING
TREASURIES, CONTROLLING OUR LIVES AND BANKRUPTING THE NATION (2009).
38. Retirement: Public Pensions ‘Not in Crisis,’ Group Says, Pointing to ‘Substantial
Assets’ for Long Run, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 162 (Feb. 8, 2011).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 33 (quoting Keith Brainard, Research Director, National
Association of State Retirement Administrators).
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failure of public officials to properly fund the pension system over a
period of many years.41
Further, the benefit levels in many public-sector pensions systems are far from
overly generous. “State pensions in Massachusetts average less than $26,000” a
year.42 Also, nearly a third of all state and local government employees (including
this author) do not earn social security retirement benefits. This is because public
employment in some states is not covered by social security. 43 One survey reported
the following average pension benefits: California, $2,008 per month or $24,097
per year; Colorado, $2,278 per month or $27,339 per year (and no social security);
Florida, $1,468 per month or $17,617 per year; and Ohio, $1,961 per month or
$23,535 per year (and no social security).44
Also, states have cut back on their contributions to public employee pension
plans; one study estimates this increased the funding shortfall by $80 billion. 45
Public employers made insufficient contributions to pension plans when the stock
market was doing well. It was convenient politics—although poor economics—to
assume this would continue indefinitely. 46 Actuarial assumption regulation is one
area for potential reform. For example, rules on the actuarial assumptions that can
be used in public-sector pension financing could be tightened such that plan
administrators and politicians could not assume, for example, unrealistically high
rates of return on investments or unrealistically low rates of retirement. 47 Notably,

41. CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T EXCELLENCE, STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS: AN
OVERVIEW OF FUNDING ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 2 (2011), available at http://www.slge.org/
vertical/Sites/%7BA260E1DF-5AEE-459D-84C4-876EFE1E4032%7D/uploads/%7BDE913A111C4F-475D-BF0E-1662B0C67612%7D.PDF.
42. Crosby, supra note 25.
43. See Dean Baker, The Public Pension Outrage and Alan Greenspan’s Pension,
TRUTHOUT (Aug. 16, 2010), http://archive.truthout.org/the-public-pension-outrage-and-alangreenspans-pension62358; see also Retirement Planner: State and Local Government
Employment, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/stateandlocal.htm (Social
Security Administration website page noting that some public employment is not covered by
social security). Around 30% of state and local government employees are not covered by
social security, including teachers in California and Texas. Thomas Margenau, Social
Security Offsets: Policies Public Employees Love to Hate and Don’t Understand, THE
CONTRIBUTOR, Summer 2007, at 2, 3, available at http://www.nagdca.org/
content.cfm/id/contributor32007social_security_offsets_policies_public_employees_love_to
_hate_and_dont_understand. Ohio public employees (including law professors at public
universities) are also excluded from social security. See, e.g., Eickelberger v. Eickelberger,
638 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (“Appellant, as a public employee, does not
participate in the Social Security system. Instead, appellant participates in the Public
Employee Retirement System (‘PERS’) governed by R.C. Chapter 145.”).
44. NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., PENSIONOMICS: MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS (50 STATE FACT SHEETS) (2009), available at
http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/NIRS_NEI_state_factsheets.pdf.
45. DAVID MADLAND & NICK BUNKER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, STATE
BUDGET DEFICITS ARE NOT AN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION PROBLEM: THE GREAT RECESSION
IS TO BLAME 7 (2011).
46. Id.
47. See Olsen, supra note 33; MADLAND & BUNKER, supra note 45, at 7.

2012]

PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR

197

the law that governs private-sector pensions on this and other issues, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), does not apply to the public sector. 48
Still, real problems exist. One study estimates that the total unfunded obligation
for local government pension plans could be as high as $574 billion, and the
unfunded obligation for all public pension plans is approximately $3 trillion.49 The
study also predicts that only five major systems have pension assets sufficient to
pay already-promised benefits through 2025, and only twenty-nine systems have
assets sufficient to pay such benefits through 2050.50 On a more micro level, rules
of defined benefit pension plans (still fairly common in the public sector) can
sometimes be gamed. For example, defined benefit plan formulas are typically
based on some multiple of the employee’s average compensation in his or her last
few years of work.51 Employees can, in their last few years of employment,
manipulate their average compensation through promotion, working unusually
large amounts of overtime, or otherwise artificially raising their pay well above the
norm for their careers. 52 Some systems are arguably too generous in allowing
individuals to draw multiple public pensions. Some have required little or no
employee contributions.
Such issues have prompted some significant changes. Since 2010, forty-one
states have enacted significant changes to at least one of their statewide retirement
plans. Eighteen have increased pension contribution requirements. Twelve have
reduced the automatic cost of living adjustment on benefits.53 These acts increased
employee contributions to retirement plans, reduced benefits, or both. For example,
Illinois passed a law in May 2010 altering benefits for all of the state’s five pension
systems, including “raising the retirement age, limiting pension raises, capping
maximum benefits and ending public pensions for [retirees] who work another
public job.”54 Georgia also made “changes . . . to its re-employment-afterretirement rules, providing that if a retiring employee has not reached normal
retirement age on the date of retirement and returns to any paid service, his or her
application for retirement is nullified.”55 (Interestingly, but not surprisingly, there
have been no proposals to similarly amend what is by far the most generous public-

48. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2006).
49. See Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The Crisis in Local Government Pensions in
the United States, in GROWING OLD: PAYING FOR RETIREMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL MONEY
MANAGEMENT AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 47, 48–49 (Yasuyuki Fuchita, Richard J.
Herring & Robert E. Litan eds., 2011).
50. See id. at 70–71 tbl.3-7.
51. See PETER A. DIAMOND, ALICIA H. MUNNELL, GREGORY LEISERSON & JEAN-PIERRE
AUBRY, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, NO. 12, PROBLEMS WITH STATE-LOCAL FINAL PAY PLANS
AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 2 (2010).
52. See id. at 3–5.
53. Monica Davey, Many Workers in Public Sector Retiring Sooner, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
6, 2011, at A18.
54. See Smith & Haberman, supra note 21.
55. Tripp Baltz, Retirement: Facing Long-Term Pension Problems, States Are Turning
to Legislative Fixes, 48 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1156 (Oct. 5, 2010).
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sector pension plan in the country: the plan that covers former members of the U.S.
military.)56
In October 2010, California enacted changes to its pension plan for state
employees.57 The Act increased the amount current employees must contribute
toward their retirements; decreased pension benefits to newly hired employees; and
changed the pension calculation to use the average of the three highest salary years,
not the single highest year.58 The Act also contains “transparency” provisions that
require the California Public Employees’ Retirement System to submit specific
information to the legislature, governor, and state treasurer regarding contribution
rates, discount rates used to calculate liabilities, alternative discount rates, and
various other assumptions.59
B. Are Public Employees “Overpaid”?
While studies on this point do not all agree, the more careful studies show that,
comparing similar workers with similar credentials in similar jobs, public
employees are more often paid less than comparable private-sector workers.60
Nevertheless, the first wave of attacks on public-sector workers included claims
that they were overpaid.
For example, Andrew Biggs, of the American Enterprise Institute, wrote that
federal workers are significantly overpaid relative to private-sector workers.61
“Even after including the full range of control variables in our own analysis, we
found that federal workers continue to earn a pay premium of around 12 percent
over private workers.”62
In contrast, though, a study by the Office of Personnel Management concluded
that two of the main studies purporting to show that federal employees were paid
more than private-sector workers (from the Heritage Foundation and the Cato
Institute) were inaccurate.63 The figures on which Cato and Heritage relied, from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, “look only at gross averages, including retail
and restaurant service workers and other entry-level positions that reduce private
sector average pay in comparison to the Federal average, which does not include
many of these categories in its workforce.”64 Also, the federal sector includes a

56. See M.S., America’s Most Generous Public Pension, Democracy in America,
ECONOMIST
(Aug.
10,
2010,
8:46
PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/
democracyinamerica/2010/08/pension_funding.
57. See Act of Oct. 20, 2010, ch. 3, 2010 Cal. Stat. 5152 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of CAL. GOV’T CODE).
58. Laura Mahoney, State Employees: Governor to Sign Pact with Rollbacks of
Pensions 100 Days into Fiscal Year, 195 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), A18 (Oct. 8, 2010).
59. Id.
60. Andrew G. Biggs & Jason Richwine, Those Underpaid Government Workers, AM.
SPECTATOR, Sept. 2010, at 28, 28.
61. Id. at 28–29.
62. Id. at 29.
63. See Laura D. Francis, Compensation: OPM, NTEU Dispute Reports That Feds Paid
Twice as Much as Private Sector, 48 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 994 (Aug. 24, 2010).
64. Id. (quoting John Berry, Director, Office of Personnel Management).
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significantly higher percentage of highly specialized and professional employees,
who are actually paid less than their private-sector counterparts.65
Generally, studies that find public workers are overpaid tend to look at gross
average pay or median pay but do not take into account the different types of jobs
in the public sector and, sometimes, the different kinds of workers. 66 Simply
looking at aggregate data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics makes it seem as if
public workers earn more on average than private workers, but the gap disappears
completely when one compares similar workers (including age, experience, and
education) in similar jobs.67 There are many more professional jobs in the public
sector, and fewer unskilled service jobs.68
Biggs has also argued that public employees generally may be receiving greater
benefits.
Public employees receive pensions that are about twice as large for
each dollar of contributions as do private-sector employees. That is,
assuming each worker (and his employer) contribute a given amount
toward pensions each year, public-sector workers receive a guaranteed
benefit at retirement that’s about twice as high. . . . [T]his is a result of
bogus pension accounting at the state level, which allows state pensions
to assume they can earn high investment returns without risk. As a
result, public pensions are underfunded by more than $3 trillion.
Nevertheless, it’s the taxpayer, not public-sector retirees, who bear the
costs of this.
Second, more than 80 percent of public-sector workers are eligible
for retiree health benefits (often referred to as OPEBs, or Other PostEmployment Benefits), versus only around one-third in the private
sector. OPEBs generally provide full coverage from the time a
government worker retirees [sic] (often in their early to mid-50s) up
until Medicare starts at age 65. . . . (Private-sector retiree health
coverage, where it exists, is generally less generous, with higher
deductibles and co-pays.) . . . [T]he Pew Center on the States reports
that states currently owe around $500 for OPEBs . . . . That means that
public-sector employees have effectively received an additional $500
billion in deferred compensation that is currently off the books. 69
On the other hand, a recent study from the National Institute on Retirement
Security concluded:
Wages and salaries of state and local employees are lower than those
for private sector workers with comparable earnings determinants (e.g.,
education). State employees typically earn 11 percent less; local
workers earn 12 percent less.

65. See id.
66. Biggs & Richwine, supra note 60.
67. See Joseph A. McCartin, Convenient Scapegoats: Public Workers Under Assault,
DISSENT, Spring 2011, at 45, 45–46.
68. Id.
69. Andrew Biggs, ‘Public Employees Get More Benefits,’ ENTERPRISE BLOG (July 28,
2010, 10:02 AM), http://blog.american.com/2010/07/public-employees-get-more-benefits/.
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Over the last 20 years, the earnings for state and local employees
have generally declined relative to comparable private sector
employees. . . .
Benefits (e.g., pensions) comprise a greater share of employee
compensation in the public sector.
[Still] [s]tate and local employees have lower total compensation
than their private sector counterparts. On average, total compensation is
6.8 percent lower for state employees and 7.4 percent lower for local
workers, compared with comparable private sector employees. 70
Several new, specific, and sophisticated studies also find that public workers
are, if anything, underpaid relative to the private sector. Economists at the Center
for Economic and Policy Research studied workers in New England, and found that
while the average state or local government employee there earns higher wages
than the average private-sector worker, that is because public workers are, on
average, older and much better educated.71 Specifically, over half of state and local
government employees in New England have a four-year college degree or more,
and roughly 30% have an advanced degree. 72 Only 38% of private-sector workers
have a four-year college degree or more, and only 13% have an advanced degree. 73
Also, the typical state and local worker in New England is about four years older
than the typical private-sector worker.74 After adjusting for these factors, publicsector wages were generally lower than private-sector wages.75 While the lowest
paid public workers earned slightly more than their private-sector counterparts, for
engineers, professors, and others in the higher-paid professional jobs, the wage
penalty for being a public worker was almost 13%.76
Such studies have been done for states across the nation and for specific public
employers. For example, a study from Georgia State University analyzing data
from across the nation found that “[h]olding constant education, estimated work
experience, occupation, location, race, and gender . . . [public] employees earned 4
to 6% less than comparable private sector workers in 1990, 2000, and 2005–
06 . . . .”77 Focusing more narrowly, a study by the chief economist in the office of

70. KEITH A. BENDER & JOHN S. HEYWOOD, OUT OF BALANCE?: COMPARING PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTOR COMPENSATION OVER 20 YEARS 3 (2010), available at
http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/final_out_of_balance_report_april_2010.p
df.
71. Jeffrey Thompson & John Schmitt, The Wage Penalty for State and Local
Government Employees in New England 3 (Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Research, Working
Paper No. 232, 2010), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/
working_papers/working_papers_201-250/WP233.pdf.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Gregory B. Lewis & Chester S. Galloway, A National Analysis of Public/Private
Wage Differentials at the State and Local Levels by Race and Gender 22 (Ga. State Univ.
Andrew Young Sch. of Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 11-10, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1768190.
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the New York City Comptroller found that employees in the New York City
municipal workforce are paid 17% less on average than their private-sector
counterparts.78
The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) has also compared public- and
private-sector compensation in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ohio, states with
relatively strong union presence and relatively robust public-sector collective
bargaining statutes.79 For Michigan, the study concluded that, after controlling for
education, experience, organizational size, gender, race, ethnicity, citizenship, and
disabilities, full-time state and local government workers are undercompensated by
approximately 5.3% compared to the private sector (2.9% when annual hours
worked are factored in). 80 For Wisconsin, the study found that public employees are
undercompensated by 8.2% (4.8% when annual hours worked are factored in). 81
For Ohio, the study found that public workers are undercompensated by 5.9%
(3.5% when hours are factored in).82
An EPI study made similar findings on a national scale. Looking at public and
private workers nationwide, it found a slight undercompensation of public
employees on a cost per hour basis, after controlling for education, experience,
hours, employer size, gender, race, ethnicity, and disability. 83 On average, full-time
state and local employees are undercompensated by 3.7%, in comparison to similar
private-sector workers.84
A very recent overview, surveying the research on this issue, concluded:
The existing research, much of which is very current (completed within
the past two years), shows that, if anything, public employees are
underpaid relative to their private-sector counterparts. While
public-sector benefits are higher than private sector counterparts, total
compensation (including health care and retirement benefits) is lower
than that of comparable private-sector employees. Erosion of publicsector pay and benefits will make it harder for public employers to

78. John Herzfeld, Public Employees: Municipal Pay Below Private Sector, New York
City Comptroller Study Finds, 46 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A10 (Mar. 9, 2011).
79. See infra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
80. JEFFREY H. KEEFE, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 293, ARE MICHIGAN
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES OVER-COMPENSATED? 1 (2011), available at http://www.epi.org/page//old/briefingpapers/BriefingPaper293%20%282%29.pdf?nocdn=1.
81. JEFFREY H. KEEFE, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 290, ARE WISCONSIN
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES OVER-COMPENSATED? 1 (2011), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/
9e237c56096a8e4904_rkm6b9hn1.pdf.
82. JEFFREY H. KEEFE, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 296, ARE OHIO PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES OVER-COMPENSATED? 1 (2011), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/
6ddeb152266bf6714f_6xm6b955l.pdf.
83. JEFFREY KEEFE, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 276, DEBUNKING THE
MYTH OF THE OVERCOMPENSATED PUBLIC EMPLOYEE: THE EVIDENCE 1 (2010), available at
http://epi.3cdn.net/8808ae41b085032c0b_8um6bh5ty.pdf.
84. Id. The study also found a smaller compensation penalty for local government
employees (1.8%) than for state government workers (7.6%). Id.
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attract, retain and motivate the workforce needed to provide public
services.85
C. Collective Bargaining Rights Are Not Correlated with State Deficits
The claim that public employees are overpaid is often linked to the claim that
collective bargaining rights for public workers increases their compensation to the
point that it is a significant cause of state budget deficits. But no significant
correlation between public-sector bargaining rights and state deficit levels has been
shown. At a recent hearing on this issue, Rep. Mike Quigley observed that states
that allow public-sector collective bargaining on average have a 14% deficit
relative to their budgets, while states that bar collective bargaining have 16.5%
deficits.86 For example, Texas, which has essentially no public-sector collective
bargaining and very low levels of unionization, has one of the worst budget deficits
in the nation.87 Nevada, which has no collective bargaining rights for state
employees, also has one of the largest state budget deficits in the country. 88 In
contrast, some states with strong public-sector bargaining laws, including those at
the center of these debates, have smaller than average deficits. Wisconsin was
projected to have a deficit of 12.8% of its budget in fiscal year 2012, Ohio 11%,
and Iowa 3.5%.89 In contrast, North Carolina, which bars all public-sector
collective bargaining, is running a projected deficit of 20% in 2012.90
Nonetheless, opponents of public-sector unions insist on making dubious
assumptions and links. For example, a recent piece in the conservative National
Affairs argued:
When all jobs are considered, state and local public-sector workers
today earn, on average, $14 more per hour in total compensation
(wages and benefits) than their private-sector counterparts. . . .
When unions have not been able to secure increases in wages and
salaries, they have turned their attention to benefits. . . . Of special
interest to the unions has been health care: Across the nation, 86% of
state- and local-government workers have access to employer-provided
health insurance, while only 45% of private-sector workers do. . . .
The unions’ other cherished benefit is public-employee pensions. . . .
How, one might ask, were policymakers ever convinced to agree to
such generous terms? As it turns out, many lawmakers found that
increasing pensions was very good politics. They placated unions with
future pension commitments . . . .
Public-sector unions thus distort the labor market, weaken public
finances, and diminish the responsiveness of government and the
quality of public services. Many of the concerns that initially led

85. Lewin et al., supra note 33, at 2.
86. State Employees: House Panel Debates State Budget Problems, Whether Bargaining
Rights Need to Be Cut, 25 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 700 (Apr. 21, 2011).
87. MADLAND & BUNKER, supra note 45, at 4.
88. Id. at 3–4; KEARNEY WITH CARNEVALE, supra note 7, at 61.
89. MADLAND & BUNKER, supra note 45, at 4.
90. McCartin, supra note 67, at 46.
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policymakers to oppose collective bargaining by government
employees have, over the years, been vindicated.91
For reasons described above and for reasons I have argued elsewhere, 92 I think
that these arguments are flawed and that the concluding sentence above is wrong. It
is especially troubling to see public-sector unions and public-sector collective
bargaining blamed for pension problems given that, again, in the vast majority of
jurisdictions, public-sector unions are not even permitted to bargain about
pensions.93 The debate is often highly partisan (unions disproportionately support
Democrats, Republicans disproportionately disapprove of unions), which can make
the search for the truth more difficult. 94 But public-sector unions in the age of
Obama will have to counter such narratives, and the first round has gone to labor’s
opponents.
D. The New Laws
In late 2010 through the first half of 2011, a number of states passed laws
restricting—and in some cases, eliminating or practically eliminating—the
collective bargaining rights of public-sector workers and their unions.
1. Wisconsin
Prior to recent amendment, Wisconsin had two fairly similar public-sector labor
statutes: one covering local and county government employees, 95 and the other
covering state employees.96 Ironically, the former was the first state law permitting
public-sector collective bargaining in the country, enacted in 1959. 97 The “Budget
Repair Bill” recently signed by Gov. Scott Walker 98 makes sweeping revisions to

91. Daniel DiSalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Fall
2010, at 3, 14–15, 17. These claims, in turn, are echoed by conservative pundits. See, e.g.,
David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Paralysis of the State, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, at 31.
92. For my thoughts on the history and policy of the development of public-sector labor
law, see generally SLATER, supra note 4; see also Joseph Slater, Homeland Security vs.
Workers’ Rights? What the Federal Government Should Learn from History and Experience,
and Why, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 295 (2004).
93. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
94. One might detect some defensiveness on this point from Ohio state senator Shannon
Jones, who, in describing her support for the Ohio bill that would greatly restrict or eliminate
public-sector collective bargaining, stressed, “I am not doing this to punish unions or serve
as some sort of political payback or to dry up the source of money for campaigns, as some
have suggested.” Bebe Raupe, State Employees: Ohio Workers Under Attack, Unions Say,
from Bill to Cut Collective Bargaining Rights, 29 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A8 (Feb. 11,
2011).
95. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (West Supp. 2010) (amended 2011).
96. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.81 (West Supp. 2010) (amended 2011).
97. SLATER, supra note 4, at 158.
98. Act of March 11, 2011, Act 10, https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/
document/acts/2011/10.pdf; Clay Barbour & Mary Spicuzza, Gov. Walker Signs Budget Bill
Limiting Bargaining Rights, Rescinds Layoff Notices, WIS. ST. J. (Mar. 11, 2011),
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these laws (except for certain employees in “protective occupations,” mainly police
officers and firefighters).99
First, the Act eliminated collective bargaining rights entirely for some
employees: University of Wisconsin (UW) system employees, employees of the
UW Hospitals and Clinics Authority, and certain home care and childcare
providers.100 It generally limited collective bargaining to bargaining over a
percentage of total base wages increase that is no greater than the percentage
change in the consumer price index. 101 No other issues can be negotiated.102
Second, the Act imposes right-to-work rules for all Wisconsin employees except
those in “protective occupations.” 103 This means it is now illegal for unions and
employers to agree to “fair share” union security clauses under which members of a
union bargaining unit are obligated to pay that portion of their dues which goes to
representing the bargaining unit in matters related to collective bargaining. 104
Further, the Act made it illegal for an employer to agree to automatic dues
deduction for employees, even for those who wish to pay dues. 105
Third, the Act created an unprecedented mandatory recertification system under
which every union faces a recertification election every year. 106 A union will only
be recertified if 51% of the employees in the collective bargaining unit—not merely
those voting—voted for recertification.107 So, for example, if a bargaining unit had
400 members and the recertification vote was 201 favoring union representation
and 100 against, the union would be decertified because 201 is less than 51% of
400. This is a change from the prior system under which (consistent with the
NLRA and other public-sector laws) a request from 30% of the bargaining unit was
required to schedule a decertification election, decertification elections could not
take place during the terms of valid union contracts (except for a required “window
period” every three years allowing a decertification election), and the majority of
those voting determined the outcome. 108
The Act also limited the duration of collective bargaining agreements to one
year, which is very unusual in labor law.109 Further, the law now requires that
http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/article_cef20214-4bff-11e0-b67d001cc4c03286.html.
99. Paul Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Pension Litigation, 28
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 263, 265 & n.9 (2011).
100. See Act 10, §§ 323.
101. Act 10, § 245 (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. § § 111.70(4)(mb) (West Supp. 2011)).
102. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(mb)–(mc) (West Supp. 2011).
103. See Act 10, § 219 (codified as amended at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(2) (West Supp.
2011)).
104. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(2) (West Supp. 2011).
105. Act 10, § 227 (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(3g) (West Supp. 2011)).
106. See Act 10, § 242 (codified as amended at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(d)(3) (West
Supp. 2011)).
107. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(d)(3)(b) (West Supp. 2011).
108. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(d)(2)(a) (West Supp. 2010) (amended 2011). The rules
previously in place in Wisconsin were standard throughout public-sector labor statutes. See
MALIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 391–93.
109. Act 10, § 238 (codified as amended at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(cm)(8m) (West
Supp. 2011). The NLRA contains no limit on the length of contracts, and this author’s
research has failed to reveal any other public-sector jurisdiction that limits the length of
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employees pay one-half of all the required contributions to their retirement
system.110 Previously, the amount of employee contributions was negotiable—for
example, the employer could agree to pay part or all of the employee
contributions.111
On June 14, 2011, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned an injunction that
Judge Maryann Sumi previously granted against this law (based on an alleged
violation of the state Open Meetings Law requiring twenty-four hours’ notice of
certain legislative actions).112 The law is now in effect.
The law has prompted considerable political activity, from massive protests in
Madison to recall efforts aimed at both Republicans (six recall elections were
certified) who voted for the bill and Democrats (three recall elections were
certified) who fled the state in an attempt to block the bill by preventing a
legislative quorum.113 As of Summer 2011, nine recall elections have taken place;
Democrats prevailed in five, thus adding two net Democrats to the Wisconsin
Senate.114 Also, this issue obviously affected the Wisconsin Supreme Court justice
race between David Prosser and JoAnne Kloppenburg (Prosser ultimately
prevailed, but by a much smaller margin than predicted before the bill was
passed).115
2. Ohio
Ohio has a public-sector labor law applicable to most public employees. 116
Enacted in the early 1980s, it even allows most public workers to strike.117 A new
bill signed into law but later repealed, Senate Bill No. 5 (“SB 5”), was designed to
profoundly alter this law.118After the bill was signed into law, enough signatures
were gathered to put the law “on hold” until a voter referendum scheduled for
November 2011 could determine whether the law would go into effect.119 Though
collective bargaining agreements to one year.
110. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 59.875(2) (West Supp. 2011).
111. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 169.59.875, 167.62.623 (West Supp. 2010) (amended 2011).
112. State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d 436, 438 (Wis. 2011).
113. A. G. Sulzberger, Union Bill Is Law, but Debate Is Far from Over, N.Y.TIMES, Mar.
11, 2011, at A14.
114. Democratic Sen. Dave Hansen Wins Recall Election, 1330 WHBL SHEBOYGAN’S
NEWS RADIO, (July 19, 2011, 8:11 PM), http://whbl.com/news/articles/2011/jul/19/
demorcatic-sen-dave-hansen-wins-recall-election/.
115. Scott Bauer, Opponent’s Concession Seals Deal for Prosser; Kloppenburg Says the
Recount Should Serve as a “Wake-Up Call.”; Supreme Court, WIS. ST. J., June 1, 2011, at
A1.
116. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01–.27 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
117. See 1983 Ohio Laws 361; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 4117.15 (LexisNexis Supp.
2011).
118. Amended Substitute S. B. 5, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011); Mark
Naymik & Joe Guillen, Gov. John Kasich Signs Senate Bill 5 as Supporters and Opponents
Gear Up for Huge Referendum, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 31, 2011, 8:30 P.M.),
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2011/03/gov_john_kasich_signs_senate_b.html.
119. Bebe Raupe, Collective Bargaining: Repeal of Ohio Measure Curbing Collective
Bargaining for Public Workers to Be on November Ballot, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
950 (July 26, 2011).

206

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:189

the bill was eventually defeated in a voter referendum,120 SB 5 would have done the
following things, among others.
SB 5 would have eliminated collective bargaining rights entirely for certain
employees, including at least most college and university faculty, lower level
supervisors in police and fire departments, and employees of charter schools. 121 It
would also have limited the bargaining rights of some other employees, including
regional council of government employees and certain members of the unclassified
civil service, who would have been able to bargain only if the public employer
elected to bargain.122
For employees who can bargain, SB 5 would have eliminated both the right to
strike for public employees who currently have that right (all public employees
with the exception of police, fire, and a few other small categories) 123 and the right
to binding interest arbitration at impasse for employees who cannot legally
strike.124 SB 5 would have provided stiff penalties (two days’ pay for each day
striking and removal) for striking or instigating a strike. 125 Encouraging or
condoning a strike would also have been forbidden.126
Instead of the right to strike when bargaining reaches impasse127 (or, for public
safety employees, instead of the right to have a neutral interest arbitrator issue a
binding order on contract terms), 128 SB 5 would have left the parties with only
non-binding mediation and fact finding. 129 Under the bill, if these did not lead to an
agreement, the governing legislative body (often the employer itself) would simply
have been able to choose to adopt the employer’s final offer. 130 In fact finding, a
neutral party makes factual findings and issues recommendations as to contract
terms. Under the bill, the employer or a majority of the union could have then
rejected a fact finder’s recommendations131 (under the law currently in effect, a
three-fifths vote is required to reject).132 Under the bill, if either side rejected the
recommendations, the parties’ last best offers were submitted to the legislative
body of the public employer to make a selection as to contract terms. 133 The bill

120. Sabrina Tavernise, Ohio Turns Back a Law Limiting Unions’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2011, at A1.
121. See Ohio Amended Substitute S. B. 5, § 1 (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.01 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
122. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(C) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
123. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
124. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
125. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.23 (LexisNexis 2006)).
126. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.15 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
127. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
128. Id. § 4117.14(D)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
129. See Ohio Amended Substitute S. B. 5, § 1 (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.14(D) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
130. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011);
effectively this bill would leave the parties with only OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.14(D)(1)–(2), which details what steps the public employer may take).
131. Ohio Amended Substitute S. B. 5 § 1 (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN
§ 4117.14(C)(4)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
132. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(6)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
133. Ohio Amended Substitute S. B. 5, § 1 (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
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would have required the public employer’s last best offer to become the agreement
if the legislative body were to fail to choose. 134 For certain employers, if the
legislative body selected the last best offer that costs more, and the CFO of the
legislative body could not or refused to determine whether sufficient funds existed
to cover the agreement, the last best offers would have been submitted to the
voters.135 Unlike the law currently in effect, in which parties can mutually agree to
a wide range of procedures to resolve bargaining impasses, 136 this is the only
impasse procedure SB 5 would have allowed.
SB 5 would also have imposed “right-to-work” rules by barring “fair share”
agreements.137 As in Wisconsin, the effect (and, at least arguably, purpose) of this
rule is to deny unions financial resources. SB 5 would also have barred public
employers from agreeing to provide payroll deductions for any contributions to a
political action committee without written authorization from the individual
employee.138
Further, the bill would have restricted the scope of bargaining and expanded the
list of subjects that were inappropriate for collective bargaining. It specified that the
following would not be bargainable: (1) employer-paid employee contributions to
retirement systems, (2) health care benefits (except the amount of the premium the
employer and employees pay, although the provision of health care benefits for
which the employer is required to pay more than 85% of the costs is not
negotiable), (3) privatization or contracting out of a public employer’s work, and
(4) the number of employees required to be on duty or employed. 139 It would also
have permitted public employers to not bargain on any subject reserved to the
management of the governmental unit, even if the subject affected wages, hours,
and terms and conditions of employment. 140 It would have barred collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs) from providing for an hourly overtime payment rate
that exceeded the overtime rate required by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA).141 It would also have barred CBAs from containing provisions for certain
types of leave to accrue above listed amounts or to pay out for sick leave at a rate
higher than specified amounts.142 It would have barred grievances and arbitrations
based on past practice of the parties.143
SB 5 would have further restricted bargaining in education, including barring
negotiating on the minimum number of personnel, on anything that restricted the
employer’s ability to assign personnel, and on the maximum number of students
assigned to a class or teacher. 144 Also, employers would have been prevented from

§ 4117.14(D)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
134. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
135. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
137. See Ohio Amended Substitute S. B. 5, § 1 (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.09(C) (LexisNexis 2006)).
138. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.09(C) (LexisNexis 2006)).
139. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
140. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(C) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)).
141. Id. (creating OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.106(C)).
142. Id. (creating OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.108–.109).
143. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.10(A)).
144. Id. (creating OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.081(B)(1)–(3)).
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agreeing to any restriction on the public employer’s authority to acquire any
products, programs, or services from educational service centers. 145
The bill would also have given greater rights to a public employer in a state of
fiscal emergency or under “fiscal watch” to terminate, modify, or negotiate the
agreement.146 The bill seemingly would have repealed the “contract bar” rule
(under which a decertification petition cannot be filed while a CBA is in effect,
unless it is during the “window period” every three years).147 Also, it would have
repealed the provision requiring the public-sector labor law to be liberally
construed.148
The bill was repealed via a voter referendum, which was held in November
2011. Had the bill been passed, it would have been a truly radical change.
3. Other States
While Wisconsin and Ohio have gotten the most press, other states where
Republicans control most or all of state government have also passed bills limiting
the collective bargaining rights of public workers.
Alabama passed a bill (Alabama Act No. 2010-761) making it a crime to
arrange for public employee payments “by salary deduction or otherwise” to
political action committees (PACs) or organizations including unions that use part
of the money for “political activity.”149 That law has been enjoined by the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, on the grounds that the statute
is overbroad regarding activities protected by the First Amendment and that it is too
vague to provide adequate notice.150 The state is appealing.151
Idaho enacted a series of bills that curtail teachers’ collective bargaining
rights.152 Senate Bill 1108 limits such bargaining to wages and benefits. 153 It also
eliminates teacher seniority protections during layoffs and replaces tenure-track
contracts for new teachers with renewable agreements of one or two years. 154 As in
Ohio, this enacted bill is facing a campaign for repeal via a referendum. 155
Indiana enacted a statute significantly limiting the scope of bargaining for
teachers.156 For example, the statute forbids the parties to agree on certain topics in

145. Id. (creating OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.081(B)(7)).
146. Id. (creating OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.104(A)–(B)).
147. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(C) (LexisNexis 2006)).
148. Id. § 2 (repealing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.22 (LexisNexis 2006)).
149. Elliot T. Dube, Union Dues: Alabama Appeals Injunction Enjoining Statute Barring
Public Worker Deductions for Politics, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 433 (Apr. 5, 2011).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Amy Linn, Collective Bargaining: Idaho Governor Signs Measure Weakening
Teacher Bargaining; Foes Launch Referendum, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 506 (Apr.
19, 2011).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Nora Macaluso, State Laws: Indiana Governor Signs Bill Limiting Teachers’
Collective Bargaining Rights, 82 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-5 (Apr. 28, 2011).
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a contract that were formally “permissive” topics of negotiation (subjects on which
unions and employers were legally allowed to agree but were not required to
negotiate over unless both sides agree).157 It also appears to bar arbitration over
contract grievances and substitute fact finding for arbitration in impasse
resolution.158
In Michigan, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability
Act allows the governor to appoint an “emergency manager” for local governments
experiencing a “financial emergency.”159 The manager can reject, modify, or
terminate any terms of CBAs with public-sector unions.160 A pair of Detroit
municipal pension funds have filed suits alleging that this violates the Contracts
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.161 Also in Michigan, a proposed bill would
increase the penalties for striking teachers (all public-employee strikes in Michigan
are illegal), including suspension or revocation of teaching licenses.162 Further,
Michigan enacted a bill (House Bill No. 4522) that requires interest arbitrators, in
cases involving municipal police, fire, and emergency medical personnel, to give
the highest priority in their decisions to the public employer’s ability to pay.163 This
factor, generally seen as favoring employers, now trumps other factors arbitrators
must or may consider.164
Nebraska enacted a bill (Legislative Bill 397) that makes changes to the rules
governing the interest arbitrations run by the Nebraska Commission of Industrial
Relations (CIR).165 These changes, while somewhat technical, are designed to
produce lower compensation awards. Under the new law, the CIR must follow a
more specific set of criteria in finding and considering “comparable” groups of
employees with regard to wage issues. 166 Also, the new law mandates CIR to
include pension and health benefits in making compensation comparisons, and to
order changes in wages only when total compensation falls outside a range of 98%
to 102% of the comparison midpoint.167 Among other things, the law creates a
preference in wage comparisons for geographic proximity; requires out-of-state
wage information to be adjusted to reflect the Nebraska cost-of-living; authorizes

157. Id.
158. 2011 Ind. Acts 575 § 22.
159. Act of Mar. 16, 2011, Act 4, § 15(1)(4).
160. Id. § 19(1)(k).
161. State Laws: CRS Suggests Michigan Bargaining Law Could Violate Constitution’s
Contract Clause, 25 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 685 (Apr. 14, 2011); Nora Macaluso, State Laws;
Detroit Pension Systems Sue Michigan over New Emergency Manager Statute, 76 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) A-8 (Apr. 20, 2011).
162. Catherine Jun, Tougher Teacher No-Strike Law Pushed, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 30,
2011, at A1.
163. Nora Macaluso, Collective Bargaining: Michigan Law Links Municipal Finances,
Binding Arbitration in Employee Disputes, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 948 (July 26,
2011).
164. Id.
165. Christopher Brown, Collective Bargaining: Nebraska Law Reins in Agency
Overseeing Labor Disputes with Public Sector Unions, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 728
(June 7, 2011).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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appeals from CIR orders directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court; and requires a
public vote on any last, best offer of a union or an employer. 168 Union leaders
expressed relief that they avoided an elimination of public-sector collective
bargaining.169
Nevada enacted Senate Bill No. 98, which reduces the number of
public-employee supervisors eligible to engage in collective bargaining. 170 It also
mandates clauses that would reopen labor contracts during fiscal emergencies. 171
This affects only local government and their employees, since state employees in
Nevada do not have collective bargaining rights. 172 Specifically, the new law states
that employees who make budgetary decisions and who have authority on behalf of
the employer to hire, fire, discipline, and negotiate labor contracts for management
are not covered by the collective bargaining law. 173 It also makes ineligible doctors
employed by a local government and civil lawyers who are assigned to a civil law
division, department, or agency. 174
New Hampshire enacted Senate Bill No. 1, which eliminates the requirement
that the terms of a collective bargaining agreement automatically continue if an
impasse is not resolved at the time of the expiration of such agreement. 175 About
three months later, New Hampshire adopted House Bill 589, which repealed a 2007
law that provided for mandatory card check recognition (that is, the employer must
recognize a union if a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit sign
cards indicating they want that union to represent them). 176
The New Hampshire House, on March 30, 2011, approved legislation (House
Bill No. 2) that would eliminate the negotiated terms of employment for public
workers and make them “at-will” employees at the end of a CBA’s term. 177 Also,
on April 20, 2011, the New Hampshire Senate passed a “right-to-work” bill that
would apply to both public- and private-sector unions.178 The New Hampshire
Senate passed the latter bill by a large enough margin to override a gubernatorial
veto but, as of this writing, it has not yet been enacted.179

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. William H. Carlile, Collective Bargaining: Nevada Governor Signs Measure
Curbing Public Sector Supervisors’ Bargaining Rights, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
834 (June 28, 2011).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Rick Valliere, Collective Bargaining: N.H. Repeals ‘Evergreen’ Requirement for
Public Worker Bargaining Contracts, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 295 (Mar. 8, 2011).
176. Rick Valliere, Organizing: New Hampshire Lawmakers Repeal Public Employee
Card Check Law, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 764 (June 14, 2011).
177. Rick Valliere, Collective Bargaining; New Hampshire House Passes Measure to
End Union Terms at Contract Expiration, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 437 (Apr. 5,
2011).
178. Rick Valliere, State Laws: New Hampshire Senate OKs Right-to-Work Bill Passed
by House, 76 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-12 (Apr. 20, 2011).
179. Id.
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New Jersey enacted Senate Bill No. 2937, which mandates significant cutbacks
in pension and health benefits for public employees. 180 It also enacted Assembly
Bill No. 3393, which caps wage increases at 2% for New Jersey police and
firefighter arbitration awards for contracts expiring between January 1, 2011, and
April 1, 2014.181 Further, Assembly Bill No. 3393 placed serious restrictions on
interest arbitrators.182 Arbitrators will now be randomly selected (as opposed to the
previous process of mutual selection); arbitrator compensation is limited to $1,000
per day and $7,500 per case; and arbitrators will be penalized $1,000 per day for
failure to issue an award within forty-five days of the filing of a request for interest
arbitration.183
Oklahoma, in House Bill No. 1593, repealed a 2004 law requiring cities with
populations of at least 35,000 to engage in collective bargaining with unions. 184 As
in Wisconsin, this change does not affect police officers and firefighters, who, in
Oklahoma, are covered by a separate statute.185 However, a separate bill is pending
that would affect the rights of police officers and firefighters to binding
arbitration.186
Tennessee eliminated collective bargaining for public school teachers in House
Bill No. 130 and in Senate Bill No. 113.187 This law deletes the state’s Education
Professional Negotiations Act of 1978 (Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-601) and replaces
it with language providing for “collaborative conferencing.” 188 Teachers now will
be represented by groups that receive at least 15% of votes in a confidential poll
rather than a particular union or recognized professional employees’ association.189
Local school boards may meet with teachers’ representatives to try to reach
agreement on issues such as pay, benefits, working conditions, leave, and grievance
procedures.190 But the new law prohibits discussing certain issues during the
conferences: differentiated pay plans or incentive compensation programs;
expenditures of grants or awards designated for specific purposes; employee
evaluations; staffing decisions and certain “innovative educational programs”

180. Lorraine McCarthy, Retirement/Health Benefits: New Jersey Lawmakers Approve
Measure for Sweeping Public Sector Benefits Reforms, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 830
(June 28, 2011).
181. Lorraine McCarthy, Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Jersey Governor Signs
Public Safety Interest Arbitration Bill with Salary Caps, 48 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
1494 (Dec. 28, 2010).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Nancy J. Moore, Collective Bargaining: Repeal of Oklahoma Law Requiring City
Collective Bargaining Signed by Governor, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 612 (May 10,
2011).
185. Nancy J. Moore, State Laws: Oklahoma Legislature Oks Bill Repealing Law
Requiring Cities to Recognize Unions, 78 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-7 (Apr. 22, 2011).
186. See id.
187. Andrew M. Ballard, Collective Bargaining: Tennessee Governor Signs Legislation
Nixing Collective Bargaining for Teachers, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. R (BNA) 724 (June 7,
2011).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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approved by lawmakers; personnel decisions regarding employee assignment; and
payroll deductions for political activities. 191
E. The Radical Nature of the Changes
As discussed above, significant evidence contradicts claims that these laws
would help with budget problems. Public workers are not “overpaid,” problems in
pension underfunding are generally not related to collective bargaining rights, and
there is no real correlation between collective bargaining rights and the levels of
state deficits.
Further, many of the new rules obviously have no relation to state budgets or
employee compensation; instead, they are meant to damage unions as institutions.
Notably, “right-to-work rules” that bar “fair share” agreements only go to whether
unions can require employees in a union bargaining unit to pay that portion of
union dues which go to activities related to collective bargaining. Right-to-work
rules have been criticized in that they permit “free riders” because unions continue
to have a duty to fairly represent employees in a union bargaining unit even if such
employees are not paying any dues. 192 But just as importantly here, whether
employees pay dues to a union or not has no impact on public budgets.
The Wisconsin statute has additional rules which clearly do not relate to the
state budget. First, the law bars dues checkoff for employees who want to pay dues
to the union, even if the employer would agree to it. 193 Second, the law’s onerous
and unprecedented provisions for yearly recertification, applicable to the majority
of the bargaining unit, have no purpose other than to make it very difficult for a
union to stay certified. In Wisconsin previously and in labor law generally, once a
union has been certified, its status can be challenged if 30% of the members of the
bargaining unit request an election to do so, and the union can be decertified in the
election if a majority of those voting choose that option. This long-established rule
in both the public and private sectors correctly balances the need for stability in
labor relations with the concept that a union should not represent employees if a
majority of the employees does not wish it.
The real impetus behind this law is that some Republicans wish to damage
unions institutionally because unions support Democrats more frequently than
Republicans. For example, in a fundraising letter, Wisconsin State Senate majority
leader Scott Fitzgerald explained that the goal of the Wisconsin legislation was “to
break the power of unions . . . once and for all.”194 Further, in a Fox News
interview, Fitzgerald said, “If we win this battle, and the money is not there under
the auspices of the unions, certainly what you’re going to find is President Obama

191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Michael M. Oswalt, Note, The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing Labor
Through NLRA Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 DUKE L.J. 691, 701 (2007).
193. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(d)(3)(b) (West Supp. 2011).
194. Michael Winship, Labor Pains and the GOP, SALON.COM (Apr. 1, 2011, 9:01 PM),
http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2011/04/01/labor_fights_republicans_sharia_
law_michael_winship/index.html.
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is going to have a much more difficult time getting elected and winning the state of
Wisconsin.”195
These laws are often not even supported by actual public employers. For
example, while the Wisconsin bill was pending, the executive director of the
Wisconsin Association of School Boards wrote to the Wisconsin legislature:
Many [Wisconsin Association of School Board] members are gravely
concerned that the changes in the . . . bill limiting the scope of
collective bargaining would wipe away the ability of local school
boards to use the bargaining process in ways that enhance local control
by telling local school boards they are prohibited from deciding
whether to enter into a contract on any item other than wages; and
would immeasurably harm the collaborative relationships that exist
between school boards and teachers and may lead to job actions and
other disruptions of educational services that will harm the educational
quality in our public schools. 196
Further, taking away collective bargaining rights is actively harmful. As a recent
study by labor relations experts explained:
Challenges to the freedom of association and the right to bargain
collectively places the United States out of sync with established
international human-rights principles. Collective bargaining has
historically served to increase consumer purchasing power, assure
voice in the workplace, and provide checks and balances in society.
Models for collective bargaining in the public sector have incorporated
alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms to protect the public
interest.197
As to the first point, Article 23 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of
Human Rights stresses the importance of collective bargaining rights for all
workers, including public employees. 198 So does the 1998 International Labor
Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (the
United States is a signatory to this document). 199 In the latter document, “the
United States pledged ‘to promote and to realize . . . the principles concerning the
fundamental rights’ defined in the declaration, the first of which is ‘freedom of
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.’” 200
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have publicly declared that at

195. Id.
196. Letter from John H. Ashley, Exec. Dir., Wis. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., to Honorable
Alberta Darling, Co-Chair, Joint Comm. on Fin., and Honorable Robin Vos, Co-Chair, Joint
Comm. on Fin. (Feb. 15, 2011), http://wisconsinwave.org/sites/default/files/documents/
WASB%20letter%20to%20Darling%20and%20Voss.pdf.
197. Lewin et al., supra note 33, at 3.
198. Id. at 26.
199. Id.
200. Michelle Amber, Collective Bargaining: Human Rights Groups Say State Measures
on Workers’ Rights Violate International Law, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 438 (Apr. 5,
2011) (alteration in original).
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least some of the legislation described above violates international human rights
standards.201 Human Rights Watch has noted that the “United States also is a party
to and bound by its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which guarantees everyone the right to protect his or her interests
through trade union activity, including collective bargaining . . . .”202
Further, contrary to stereotypes, unions do not cause inefficiencies; in fact, they
can improve efficiency. Data showing that unions have a positive effect come from
sources that range from international surveys to analyses of specific types of
employers. In 2002, the World Bank released a report based on more than 1000
studies of the effects of unions and collective bargaining. 203 This report found that
in the United States high unionization rates tend to have higher productivity, less
pay inequality, and lower unemployment.204 It found that workers who belong to
unions are generally better trained than their non-union counterparts and that
unions also help retain workers. 205 Also, having a large number of workers
represented by unions tended to have a stabilizing and beneficial effect on a
country’s economy.206 At the other end of the spectrum, there are studies of specific
types of public-sector unions and employers in the United States. For example,
evidence shows that unionization of teachers correlates positively with higher
student scores on standardized tests.207
A survey of the literature on unions and efficiency concluded that there “is scant
evidence that unions act to reduce productivity . . . while there is substantial
evidence that unions act to improve productivity in many industries.” 208 While this
view is not unanimous, the combined teaching of most studies is that unions can
increase productivity in many to most circumstances, and can decrease it in
others.209 In either case, the effect is usually not large. 210 Further, in recent years,

201. Id.
202. Id.
203. TOKE AIDT & ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS, THE WORLD BANK, UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: ECONOMIC EFFECTS IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 1 (2002), available at
http://www.politiquessociales.net/IMG/pdf/worldunions.pdf.
204. Id. at 70, 97, 103 (noting that variation exists across industries).
205. Id. at 77.
206. See id. at 25 (discussing how the “influence of unions can result in outcomes closer
to the competitive equilibrium”).
207. See Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell & Robert M. Carini, Do Teacher Unions
Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70
HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 448, 456 (2000).
208. Dale Belman & Richard Block, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Competitiveness and Employment: A Review of the Literature, in BARGAINING FOR
COMPETITIVENESS: LAW, RESEARCH, AND CASE STUDIES 45, 51 (Richard Block ed., 2003).
Also, an overview paper explains: “[a]nalyses of the union effect on firms and the economy
have generally found unions to be a positive force, improving the performance of firms and
contributing to economic growth . . . .” LAWRENCE MISHEL WITH MATTHEW WALTERS, ECON.
POLICY INST., HOW UNIONS HELP ALL WORKERS 15 (2003), available at
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers_bp143.
209. AIDT & TZANNATOS, supra note 203, at 26, 71–72.
210. Richard Freeman, Is Declining Unionization of the U.S. Good, Bad, or Irrelevant?,
in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 143, 155–56 (Larry Mishel & Paula Voos eds.,
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new innovations in problem solving in labor management negotiations have
brought new efficiencies to union workplaces, keeping the efficiencies brought by
worker voice and a highly skilled workforce while eliminating certain types of
work rules that may be less appropriate to modern workplaces. 211
II. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, BARGAINING, AND FURLOUGHS
A. Interest Arbitration Cases
A plurality of states permits public employees to bargain, to bar strikes, and to
resolve bargaining impasses through interest arbitration. All told, approximately
thirty states use some form of binding interest arbitration. 212 In this system, a
neutral arbitrator (or sometimes a tripartite board) holds a hearing, evaluates
evidence, follows statutory criteria, and makes a binding decision as to the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement.213
Public-sector statutes use three basic models of interest arbitration. 214 The first is
conventional arbitration. In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator can pick among
the parties’ proposals, create compromises, or even go beyond the parties’
proposals.215 The second is final offer whole package arbitration. In final offer
whole package arbitration, the arbitrator may only choose the final set of proposals
from the union or the final set of proposals from the employer, as a package. 216 The
third is final offer issue-by-issue arbitration. In this system, the arbitrator must
choose from final proposals from one side or the other, but the arbitrator may
choose final proposals on some issues from one side and final proposals on other
issues from the other side. 217
Also, statutes providing for binding interest arbitration almost always include
specific criteria which the arbitrator must consider and evaluate in making the
arbitration award.218 The employer’s ability to pay is a standard factor the arbitrator
must consider, as are the pay and conditions of similar employees (often called
“comparables”).219
Given the former factor, the economic crisis has played a big role in interest
arbitrations in the age of Obama. Public employers consistently rely on the
economic crisis to justify their positions. Even cases ruling in favor of a union have
noted it. For example, an April 2010 interest arbitration award involving Helena,
Montana concluded:
1992) (“The majority of studies find that union firms have higher productivity, but there are
well-documented exceptions.”).
211. Lewin et al., supra note 33, at 23–26.
212. KEARNEY WITH CARNEVALE, supra note 7, at 264–65.
213. Id. at 274.
214. Charles Rehmus, Interest Arbitration, in LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR: REDEFINING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 196–214 (John Bonner ed., 1999).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Arvid Anderson & Loren A. Krause, Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to the
Strike, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 153, 158 (1987).
219. See id. at 159–60.
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The City was shown to have the ability to pay for the increase. . . .
[T]he City made what was essentially an equitable plea and asserted
that fundamental fairness and one’s “gut” sense should govern here as
well. While there is some pull to that argument, especially given the
economic circumstances around the nation and the state of
Montana, . . . [and] there was some cogency to the claim that at this
point in history even a small increase should be regarded as something
of great benefit, the evidence and assertions demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Union’s position was more
justified than the City’s on this record.220
Most arbitrators in these times have given more weight to the recession’s effect
on the employer’s ability to pay than to other factors. An award from Washington
state declared, “[T]his Arbitrator took the position that in the current tough
economic times the State’s ability to pay trumps all of the other statutory
factors . . . .”221 Similarly, another arbitrator in a Minnesota case explained:
Minnesota’s general economic conditions have deteriorated sharply
since CY 2007. For this reason, the wage and insurance terms that the
instant parties might have voluntarily negotiated under the prevailing
economic and fiscal regime most likely would have been different from
those that were negotiated by comparable external bargaining units
during better times—2007. Accordingly, the Arbitrator is not inclined
to rely on the “dated” negotiated settlements of comparable external
bargaining units—a conclusion that is strongly attenuated by the
Employer’s increasingly strained ability-to-pay.222
In another Minnesota case, a different arbitrator noted that “the vast majority of
cities in the Employer’s comparison group are proposing 0% [wage increases] for
2010. . . . Some cities and counties are settling at 0% . . . .” 223
In sum, the economic crisis is hurting public-sector workers in contract
negotiations. While this may not be shocking, it is worth noting that the most
common approach to resolving public-sector impasses may exacerbate this
tendency. Most public workers are not allowed to strike, and the most common
alternative is interest arbitration. Interest arbitrators are generally required, by
statute, to consider the employer’s ability to pay. And in hard economic times, that
factor is often the trump card for employers in the arbitrations.

220. City of Helena v. IAFF, Local 448, BOPA Case No. 5-2010, at *22 (407-2010)
(Apr. 19, 2010) (Jacobs, Arb.), available at http://erd.dli.mt.gov/images/stories/
pdf/labor_standards/decisions/firefighter/4-19-10_helena.pdf.
221. State of Washington v. SEIU Local 775 NW, Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n No.
23406-1-10-0552, at *15 (Sept. 29, 2009) (Williams, Arb.), available at
http://www.perc.wa.gov/Databases/IntArb/22677-I.htm.
222. Metro. Council & Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., Local No. 203, BMS Case
No. 08–PN-1141 (Feb. 27, 2009) (Bognanno, Arb.).
223. City of West St. Paul v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., Local No. 72, BMS
No. 09-PN-1062 (Jan. 19, 2010) (Miller, Arb.) (internal citation omitted).
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B. Furlough Cases and the Contract Clause
Beyond interest arbitration awards, many public employers, including those with
unionized employees, have imposed involuntary furloughs—mandatory days off
without pay—as well as staffing cuts. Between 2007 and 2009, over half the states
implemented mandatory furloughs.224 In 2010, California and New York ordered
furloughs for a combined total of approximately 250,000 state employees. 225
For unionized public employees, furloughs often at least seem to violate the
express terms of the collective bargaining agreement that covers them. Unions have
challenged such actions, notably under the Contract Clause of the Constitution. The
Contract Clause provides that “No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”226 Such challenges to furloughs have, however,
largely been unsuccessful.
For example, in Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s
County, Maryland,227 the Fourth Circuit rejected a Contract Clause challenge to
involuntary furloughs. In that case, in reaction to budget problems, the county
employer instituted a furlough plan which required approximately 5900 employees
to forego 80 scheduled work hours in fiscal year 2009. 228 This amounted to a 3.85%
annual pay reduction.229 The employer relied on a section of the county’s personnel
law, which authorized the county to furlough employees when the county executive
determined that a revenue shortfall required the compensation level of a
department, agency, or office to be reduced.230 The district court upheld the union’s
Contract Clause challenge to this act.231
The Fourth Circuit reversed. 232 It first described the three-part test used in
Contract Clause cases, which is intended to balance the Clause’s protections
against the states’ reserved police powers: “(1) whether there has been an
impairment of the contract; (2) whether that impairment was substantial; and (3) if
so, whether the impairment was nonetheless a legitimate exercise of the police
power.”233 Here, the first prong was not satisfied because the court found other
sections of the county personnel law made all provisions of collective bargaining
agreements subject to all provisions of the county’s personnel law, including the
provisions authorizing furloughs. 234
The Fourth Circuit did note that a different result would have obtained had
plaintiff unions been able to identify any part of their contracts that specifically
prohibited furloughs; “If they had made such an identification, the Unions would

224. Stephen F. Befort, Unilateral Alteration of Public Sector Collective Bargaining
Agreements and the Contract Clause, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 11 (2011).
225. Id.
226. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
227. 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010).
228. Id. at 186.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 190–91 (citing P.G. COUNTY CODE § 16-229(a)).
231. Id. at 187.
232. Id. at 193.
233. Id. at 188.
234. Id. at 190–91.
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have been entitled to summary judgment,” as part of the county personnel law
authorizing a contract provision to override the general authority for furloughs. 235
The union, however, relied on somewhat more general language guaranteeing
wages and hours.236 These sections, the court held, were not enough. 237
The California Supreme Court recently upheld furloughs of state employees
under a different theory in a case involving somewhat different facts. 238 Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger had ordered furloughs for state workers on the first and
third Fridays of each month from February 2009 to June 2010.239 In a lengthy
opinion, the court first held that the trial court erred in deciding that Governor
Schwarzenegger’s declaration of a fiscal emergency in an executive order gave him
the authority to impose furloughs unilaterally on state workers. 240 Code sections
that might have given the governor authority to issue furloughs were superseded by
the state public-sector labor law governing state employees. 241 So, when the
governor issued his furlough order on December 19, 2008, it was not valid at that
time.242 But subsequently, on February 19, 2009, the legislature enacted a revision
to the 2008 budget, reducing the 2008–09 fiscal appropriation for state employee
compensation to a level which reflected the reduced compensation to be paid under
the governor’s furlough plan.243 This, the court held, was a permissible method to
authorize and mandate such furloughs. 244
This topic is not entirely new. Unions have brought Contract Clause cases
challenging unilateral acts by governments that attempt to modify collective
bargaining agreements since the 1970s. Some have succeeded (including some
challenges to furloughs), and some have not.245 For example, in 2008 the Eighth
Circuit upheld a Contract Clause challenge to a city’s unilateral reduction in health
care premiums for retired employees.246 A collective bargaining agreement
obligated the city of Benton, Arkansas, to pay the full cost of the premiums, but
during the term of the agreement, the city council attempted to reduce the city’s
contributions.247 The court rejected the city’s claim of “economic necessity,”
holding that it only applied to “‘unprecedented emergencies,’ such as mass
foreclosures caused by the Great Depression.” 248

235. Id. at 191.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186 (Cal. 2010).
239. Id. at 1190.
240. See id. at 1212–13, 1218–19 (discussing that CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3516.5 does not
give the governor the authority to issue such an executive order).
241. See id. at 1207–12 (discussing how CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 19849, 19851 do not give
the governor authority). The court also took time to address whether authority could have
been derived from any other source. See id. at 1213–18.
242. See id. at 1220.
243. Id. at 1220.
244. Id.
245. For an overview of decades of law in this area, see Befort, supra note 224, at 30–45.
246. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 2957 v.
City of Benton, 513 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2008).
247. Id. at 877.
248. Id. at 882.
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Time will tell whether other cases will use as strict a standard as the Eighth
Circuit has—or perhaps courts will conclude that our current era is a time of
unprecedented emergencies. Contract Clause cases can depend greatly on specific
facts, specific local laws, and the attitudes of judges in analyzing the three factors
used in Contract Clause cases. As one court remarked in a Contracts Clause case
involving a teachers’ union, “public servants might well be called upon to sacrifice
first when the public interest demands sacrifice.”249
An even more dramatic strategy involves a municipal employer declaring
bankruptcy and thus voiding its obligations in collective bargaining agreements. In
June 2010 a California court rejected a union’s legal challenge to this process. 250
Notably, § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, enacted to avoid the harsh results of
bankruptcies on union contracts in the private sector, does not apply to municipal
bankruptcies.251 If the economic situation worsens, more cities may try to use
bankruptcy to avoid obligations under union contracts. Some leaders, including
former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, have even suggested that states
should consider bankruptcy as a mechanism to avoid pension obligations. 252 This
would be unchartered waters, and the idea is quite controversial. 253
III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
The federal government in the past two years has produced two intriguingly
contrasting issues on the fundamental question of whether public employees should
have the right to bargain collectively at all. In the first, employees of the TSA have
struggled to overturn a ban on collective bargaining that the Bush administration
imposed. Meanwhile, Congress has seriously considered a bill that would give
basic collective bargaining rights to all public safety employees of local
governments, essentially providing minimum rights to such employees who
currently have none. This would be the first federal law in U.S. history granting
such rights to broad swaths of state and local employees.
A. The Continuing Quest for Collective Bargaining Rights at the TSA
While this issue began during the Bush administration, there have been very
important recent developments. After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, significant
sectors of the federal government were reorganized into the Department of

249. Baltimore Teachers Union, Local 340 v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 6 F.3d
1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1993). See generally Befort, supra note 224, at 39–51 (providing a
discussion of this and related cases).
250. In re Vallejo, 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
251. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006); Befort, supra note 224, at 19–21 (section 1113 applies
only to Chapter 11 proceedings, and municipal bankruptcy is handled through Chapter 9 of
the Bankruptcy Code).
252. See, e.g., Editorial, It’s a Bankrupt Idea, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011.
253. Id. This editorial criticizes the idea of state bankruptcy. Among other things, state
bankruptcy would hurt investors in state bonds, hurt the state in trying to sell bonds, and hurt
contractors and other creditors of the state. Id. The editorial argues cuts in benefits and tax
increases would fix the problem. Id.
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Homeland Security (DHS).254 These moves included the creation of the TSA. 255
When the TSA was formed, the Bush administration determined that its workers
would not have bargaining rights. On January 8, 2003, James Loy, then the head of
the TSA, issued an order stating that TSA employees, “in light of their critical
national security responsibilities, shall not . . . be entitled to engage in collective
bargaining or be represented for the purpose of engaging in such bargaining by any
representative or organization.”256
Further, when the DHS was created, the Bush administration insisted that the
agency be allowed to create a personnel system that was not covered by existing
federal-sector labor law and civil service rules. 257 The statute creating the DHS
ultimately did grant the agency the right to create a more “flexible” system that
could provide employees and their unions fewer rights than under these
pre-existing laws.258 But Democrats made sure that the statute preserved the basic
right to bargain collectively. 259 This set the stage for litigation.260 The DHS then set
up a very restrictive system: among other things, the system allowed the DHS to
void, unilaterally, any provision of any union contract it had agreed to. 261 The union
representing DHS workers262 sued, claiming this was not “collective bargaining” as
the statute required. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff,263 the D.C.
Circuit agreed with the union. Collective bargaining is a “term of art,” and it could
not mean, inter alia, a system in which one side was not bound by collectively
bargained and signed contracts.264
This, however, did not resolve the issue of whether employees in the TSA
should have collective bargaining rights, and the issue remains contentious. The
rhetoric, especially immediately after 9/11, was not always measured. “Do we
really want some work rule negotiated prior to 9/11 to prevent us from finding
somebody who is carrying a bomb on a plane with your momma?” Senator Phil
Gramm asked in 2002.265 In contrast, in debates over labor rules in the DHS
generally, Senator Barbara Boxer insisted: “[T]he heroes of September 11 were
union members.”266 “They . . . were afforded the protections of collective
bargaining . . . . They never looked at their watch and said Oh, gee, I have been on

254. See Slater, supra note 92, at 308.
255. Id. at 314.
256. Id. (alteration in original).
257. Id. at 297.
258. See 5 U.S.C. § 9701(a)–(b)(4) (2006); Slater, supra note 92, at 309–11.
259. See Slater, supra note 92, at 309–11.
260. See id. at 313.
261. 5 C.F.R. § 9701.506(a) (2008).
262. Prior to the reorganization, many of the workers in the DHS had been union
members with bargaining rights under the statute that covers most federal employees in their
predecessor agencies. See Slater, supra note 92, at 297.
263. 452 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
264. Id. at 857–60.
265. 148 CONG. REC. 17,030 (2002).
266. 148 CONG. REC. 15,880 (2002).
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the 74th floor of the World Trade Center, and now I have worked eight hours and I
am coming down.”267
Years after 9/11, the debate continues. In 2007 the Senate approved a broad bill
that would have given collective bargaining rights to TSA workers, 268 but that
language was stripped from the bill after President Bush threatened a veto. 269 In the
fall of 2010, the House considered but did not pass a bill that would have granted
bargaining rights to TSA employees.270 President Obama’s first nominee to head
the TSA, Erroll Southers, withdrew his name from consideration at least in
significant part due to Republican opposition to collective bargaining rights for
TSA employees.271 John Pistole, the man who finally filled the position of head of
the TSA, initially refused to state whether or not he would permit TSA employees
to bargain collectively.272 He announced that DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano had
asked him to review the collective bargaining issue and make a recommendation. 273
While this issue was pending, the American Federation of Government
Employees (AFGE) and the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) were
jockeying to try to represent TSA employees. Both unions filed petitions with the
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), the federal sector analogue to the
National Labor Relations Board.274 The FLRA’s regional director rejected both
petitions on the grounds that the FLRA did not have jurisdiction because TSA
employees lack bargaining rights. 275
However, in late 2010 the full FLRA reversed and held that a union election
could go forward.276 It explained that even though a union, if elected, could not
bargain collectively, it could still represent employees in some contexts, for
example, in grievances or as a Weingarten representative277 (assisting employees
during investigations with possible disciplinary consequences). 278 The FLRA also
rejected arguments that unionization would threaten national security. 279 This is
significant first because it is unusual for a public-sector labor agency to supervise
an election and potentially to certify a union that has no right to bargain

267. Id.
268. Chris Strohm, Senate Approves Collective Bargaining for TSA Screeners, GOV’T
EXEC. (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0307/030707cdpm1.htm.
269. Daniel J. Doyle, Labor Relations Under the Bush Administration, STUDENT PULSE
(May 4, 2010), http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/245/labor-relations-under-the-bushadministration.
270. Louis LaBrecque, Union Says Screener Bargaining Rights Could Be Granted by
TSA in Late Autumn, 48 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1051 (September 14, 2010).
271. Laura D. Francis, Appointments: Pistole Says TSA Workforce Is Priority, But
Dodges Collective Bargaining Issue, 48 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 734 (June 22, 2010).
272. Id.
273. KIRSTEIN & YOUNG PLLC, WASHINGTON AVIATION SUMMARY 6 (2010), available at
http://www.yklaw.com/WashingtonAviationSummaryJuly2010.pdf.
274. Emily Long, AFGE Wins TSA Union Election, GOV’T EXEC. (June 23, 2011),
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0611/062311l1.htm.
275. LaBrecque, supra note 270.
276. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Transp. Sec. Admin., 65 F.L.R.A. 242, 248 (2010).
277. Id. at 247.
278. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 253 (1975).
279. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Transp. Sec. Admin., 65 F.L.R.A. at 245.
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collectively. It is also important because of the sheer size of the unit: more than
40,000 employees.280 In June 2011 the AFGE won a runoff election and is now the
certified representative of TSA employees.281
Meanwhile, back in February 2011, Director Pistole issued his Decision
Memorandum on the issue. 282 He has decided to create, in his words, “a
comprehensive structure that is different and distinct, separate and independent,
from [the statute that covers most federal employees], but that will provide for
genuine, binding collective bargaining on specified subjects at the national level
with the union, if any, that prevails in an election process . . . .”283 The system
would feature a scope of bargaining even more limited than the limited bargaining
permitted of most federal workers. The union could negotiate about rules on
priorities for vacation time and shift assignments, issues regarding workplace
transfers, parking subsidies, uniform allowances, the selection process for special
assignments, going from full time to part time and vice-versa, and how employees
are recognized for commendable work. 284 Unions will not be allowed to negotiate
over compensation (which is also not permitted under the general federal statute),
job qualification rules, disciplinary standards, or security procedures—including
when and where workers are deployed, and the means and methods of covert
testing and results.285 Disputes and impasses under this system will be resolved “by
panels selected from a roster of neutrals, with backgrounds in both security and
collective bargaining, who are mutually agreed upon” by the TSA and the union. 286
This may not be the last word on the issue: unions may find this inadequate, and
opponents of collective bargaining may feel it goes too far. Broadly, this issue
raises the fundamental question of whether collective bargaining is proper in the
public sector, or at least in large parts of the public sector. Arguments used to
oppose collective bargaining at the TSA—that it creates inefficiencies and delays—
could be used to oppose bargaining in practically any part of the public sector.
Unions in the age of Obama will have to counter such arguments, as questions
about the fundamental legitimacy of unions in government employment are not
going away.
B. The First Federal Law Guaranteeing Bargaining Rights for (Some) Employees
of State and Local Governments?
In contrast, the proposed Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of
2009, House Bill 413, would provide collective bargaining rights for public safety

280. Long, supra note 274.
281. See Organizing: AFGE Certified as Airport Screener Union, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 860 (July 5, 2011).
282. JOHN S. PISTOLE, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DECISION
MEMORANDUM: TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OFFICERS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (2011),
available at http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/determination_tso_and_collective_bargaining.pdf.
283. Id. at 5.
284. Id. at 9.
285. Id. at 9–10; 5 U.S.C. § 9701(d) (2006) (disallowing bargaining over compensation).
286. PISTOLE, supra note 282, at 20.
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officers employed by state or local governments.287 If enacted, it would provide
such rights for the first time to a large number of employees—mostly police and
firefighters—as a significant minority of states (approximately seventeen) do not
permit both police and firefighters to bargain collectively. 288
This Act would direct the FLRA to determine whether state laws provide
specified collective bargaining rights for public safety officers. 289 If a state’s law
did not meet the standards in the Act, the FLRA would prescribe regulations
covering the employees.
Specifically, the Act would:
(1) grant such employees the right to form and join a labor organization
which excludes management and supervisory employees;
(2) require public safety employers to recognize and agree to bargain
with the employees’ chosen labor organization;
(3) require the FLRA to issue regulations establishing rights and
responsibilities for public safety employers and employees in states that
do not substantially provide for such public safety employee rights and
responsibilities.
(4) direct the Authority, in such cases, to:
(a) determine the appropriateness of units for union representation;
(b) supervise or conduct elections to determine whether a union has
been selected as an exclusive representative by a voting majority of the
employees in an appropriate unit;
(c) resolve issues relating to the duty to bargain in good faith;
(d) conduct hearings and resolve complaints of unfair labor
practices; and
(e) resolve exceptions to arbitrators’ awards.
(5) grant a public safety employer, employee, or labor organization the
right to seek enforcement of Authority regulations and orders in state
court;
(6) prohibit public safety employers, employees, and labor
organizations from engaging in lockouts or strikes; and
(7) provide that existing collective bargaining units and agreements
would not be invalidated by this Act. 290
This bill did not pass while Democrats controlled both houses of Congress, 291
and with political power shifting in those chambers, it is much less likely now than
when I first presented this Article that this bill will become law in the near future.
Still, proponents of the bill have not given up, and conservatives and Republicans
are sometimes more sympathetic to police and firefighter unions than to other
public-sector unions.

287. H.R. 413, 111th Cong. (2009).
288. For a list of which states provide bargaining rights to which employees, see
KEARNEY WITH CARNEVAL, supra note 7, at 60–61.
289. H.R. 413 § 4(b).
290. MALIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 113–14; see also H.R. 413 § 4(b).
291. Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R.413, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.413.
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In some ways, this bill would be a substantial departure from traditional
public-sector labor law. The federal government has never attempted to grant
collective bargaining rights to large groups of state and local government
employees. The only other time the federal government has granted bargaining
rights to any state or local government employees involved the Urban Mass Transit
Act of 1964.292 This law provides funds for local governments to take over
previously private mass transit systems and requires that collective bargaining
rights of their employees be preserved.293 The Public Safety Employee Act would
affect many more employees.
In other ways, this law would not be a significant departure. Most federal
employment laws cover public employees as well as private-sector employees. In
some cases there are a few special rules, and in some cases the coverage is mostly
identical. For example, the FLSA covers state and local government employees,
although it contains some overtime rules that apply only to the public sector.294
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally applies to the public sector in
the same ways, substantively and procedurally, as it does to the private sector. 295 Is
it more intrusive for the federal government to apply anti-discrimination laws296
and wage-and-hour rules to state and local governments than to mandate minimal
collective bargaining rights?
Were this bill to become law, one would expect constitutional challenges. As
late as 1976, the Supreme Court held that applying the FLSA to state and local
government employers violated the Tenth Amendment. 297 That case was overruled
in 1985.298 But if this Act were passed, it could give the Court a chance to revisit
this issue. Notably, the Court is arguably more conservative and sensitive to issues
of state sovereignty in public employment now, as witnessed by its more recent
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. For example, in Alden v. Maine, the Court,
relying at least in part on the Eleventh Amendment, held that states were immune
from monetary damages in private suits brought by state employees under the
FLSA.299
Most broadly, passing this Act could be seen as a bold assertion of the
importance of collective bargaining rights. In contrast to the TSA controversy, it

292. See MALIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 228.
293. Id.
294. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(k), (o) (2006). These special overtime rules involve,
respectively, the ability of public employers under certain circumstances to use
compensatory time (paid time off) in lieu of money for overtime compensation, and the
ability of public safety employers to use certain alternative schedules, other than the “forty
hours in seven day” schedule, that trigger overtime liability.
295. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7. The Act does have some special
enforcement procedures for federal employees. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16.
296. In addition to Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act apply to the public sector.
297. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
298. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
299. 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 (1999); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (providing the same immunity for suits under the Americans with
Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (providing the same
immunity for suits under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
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would be an assertion of the importance of such rights in the context of employees
responsible for public safety. Still, one might wonder: why should a federal law
provide bargaining rights only to public safety employees? It is hard to find a
policy or practical principle that suggests that police and firefighters should have
collective bargaining rights, while, for example, janitors, clerks, or teachers in
government service should not.
IV. WHAT DOES “COLLECTIVE BARGAINING” MEAN? CURIOUS CASES INVOLVING
THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTION
Recent cases in Missouri have raised interesting and important questions not
only for public workers in that state, but also over the very meaning of the term
“collective bargaining.”
In 1945, Missouri added the following clause to its state Constitution:
“employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing.” 300 In 1947, in City of Springfield v. Clouse,
the Missouri Supreme Court held that this provision did not apply to public
employees.301 Sixty years later, in 2007, the Missouri Supreme Court overruled
Clouse and held this constitutional provision did cover public employees.302 This
was significant because many government employees in Missouri, notably public
school teachers and police, did not (and still do not) have a statutory right to
bargain collectively303 (other public employees in Missouri are covered by a limited
state public-sector law passed in the 1960s).304
Missouri has not yet passed a statute implementing this constitutional guarantee
or explaining how “collective bargaining” under the state constitution should work.
Every other jurisdiction that provides public employees the right to bargain
collectively has a detailed statute spelling out the rights and obligations of the
parties in the collective bargaining process. 305
Thus, after Independence in 2007, it is unclear what specific rights Missouri
public employees have under their state constitution. Not surprisingly, views vary
sharply. Public school employers in Missouri have promulgated labor relations
rules quite different from what has traditionally been considered “collective
bargaining.” In 2009, lower state courts in Missouri decided two cases involving
such systems.306 (In the interest of full disclosure, I note that in these two cases I
acted as a witness on behalf of the unions challenging these systems.)

300. 1945 Mo. Laws 7 (codified at MO. CONST. art I., § 29).
301. City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1947).
302. Independence-Nat’l. Educ. Ass'n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 137
(Mo. 2007).
303. KEARNEY WITH CARNEVALE, supra note 7, at 61.
304. MO. REV. STAT. § 105.500 (2011).
305. The two other states with constitutions that provide for public sector bargaining
rights are Florida, FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 6, and Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. 13, § 2. For the
statutory implementation of these constitutional rights, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.301 (West
Supp. 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-3 (West Supp. 2010).
306. Bayless Educ. Ass’n v. Bayless Sch. Dist., No. 09SL-CC01481 (Cir. Ct. St. Louis
County Feb. 10, 2010); Springfield Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Sch. Dist. of Springfield, No. 0931-
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In the first case, the Springfield, Missouri school district insisted that employees
be given the option to choose multiple unions to represent the same employees at
the same time.307 This is contrary to the principle of exclusive representation, a
staple of all U.S. labor laws. In the second case, the Bayless, Missouri school
district insisted that a bargaining representative could be selected in only one way:
each school within the district (elementary, middle, and high school) would elect
two individual “representatives,” and these representatives (along with a couple of
other individuals) would form a body to bargain with the employer. 308 This is
contrary to the principle in U.S. labor laws that employees are represented by an
organization designed to speak with one coherent voice and one that has the power
and responsibility to enforce a contract. It also violates the principle in U.S. labor
law that the employer cannot dictate to employees the structure of their
organization or how leaders of that organization are chosen.
In both cases, I testified on behalf of a teachers’ union that in the United States,
“collective bargaining” is and has been, historically, a term of art with some
specific meanings and requirements, which include exclusive representation, the
right to negotiate contracts that are binding on both parties, and the ability of
workers to choose freely their collective representative without interference from
employers. I discussed the use of this term and the practice under the early history
of the Railway Labor Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, the War Labor
Boards (for both World Wars), and the early years of the National Labor Relations
Act. The Springfield case was decided in the employer’s favor, but the Bayless case
found a violation of the Missouri Constitution.
More specifically, in Springfield National Education Association v. Springfield
School Board, the school board promulgated a system for union recognition that
included the following provision: employees in a bargaining unit of teachers could,
in an initial ballot, choose to be represented by one union, multiple unions, or no
union.309 Under the multiple union option, more than one union would
simultaneously represent the same group of teachers. 310 Nothing required that the
labor organizations agree to this or have consistent goals. 311 Thus, the same
employees could be represented, simultaneously, by two (or more) hostile and
competing unions. This, as noted above, contradicts the principle in U.S. labor law
of exclusive representation: only one union represents one group of employees.
The Springfield judge relied on modern dictionary definitions of “collective
bargaining.” Specifically, the judge quoted the Independence decision, which had
referenced “collective bargaining” briefly in a footnote:
“The dictionary definition says ‘collective bargaining’ is ‘negotiation
for the settlement of the terms of a collective agreement between an
employer or group of employers on one side and a union or number of
unions on the other.[’]” The [Missouri] Supreme Court thereafter
quoted BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th Ed. 2004), which says:
CV08322 (Cir. Ct. Greene County Sept. 10, 2009).
307. Springfield Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, No. 0931-CV08322 at *12.
308. Bayless Educ. Ass’n, No. 09SL-CC01481 at *5.
309. See Springfield Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, No. 0931-CV08322 at *12.
310. See id.
311. See id. at *2–9.
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“‘collective bargaining’ means ‘negotiations between an employer and
the representatives of organized employees to determine the conditions
of employment . . . .[’]”
None of the definitions referenced by the [Missouri] Supreme Court
suggest the phrase “collective bargaining” mandates exclusive
representation.312
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, one wonders about using modern
dictionaries to define terms put into a constitution more than sixty years ago. As a
practical matter, the possibility of multiple union representation would seem
unworkable, at least in situations (as in the Springfield case) where the two
competing unions were hostile to each other but had the traditional duties standard
in U.S. labor law (contract negotiation, grievance handling, duty of fair
representation, etc.).
The effect of this decision for these parties was largely mooted by subsequent
events on the ground. After the decision, the teachers voted to use the “one union
representative” model—and voted in the union on whose behalf I testified. 313 But
the model proposed in Springfield arose in another Missouri school district. 314
A few months after Springfield, the union in Bayless successfully challenged a
different system the Bayless school board had created.315 In Bayless, the employer
required employees in each school in the district to select two individual
representatives and two alternates; these representatives, plus one representative
designated by the union with the largest employee membership, would then be
allowed, as a group, to bargain with the employer. 316
Bayless held this did not satisfy the constitutional right to bargain collectively. 317
The judge in Bayless distinguished Springfield, explaining that in the Springfield
process, employees were at least permitted to choose a traditional exclusive
representative.318 In contrast, the process in Bayless “mandates collaborative
bargaining, not collective bargaining through a union representative.” 319 It is not
clear where the judge got the term “collaborative bargaining”; it does not appear in
the Missouri Constitution, Missouri’s public-sector labor statute, or relevant case
law. It would have been better, in my view, for Bayless to have held that, among
other things, this system would not have allowed the employees a “representative
of their own choosing” (per the Constitutional language). In any case, after the

312. Id. at *13–14 (quoting Independence-Nat’l. Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist.,
223 S.W.3d 131, 138 n.6 (Mo. 2007)).
313. SNEA Wins Exclusive Rep Election, SOMETHING BETTER ONLINE (Spring 2010),
http://www.mnea.org/Missouri/SomethingBetterOnline1/31.aspx.
314. Grandview Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Grandview C-4 Sch. Dist., No. 1016-CV23514 (Cir.
Ct. Jackson County). As of this writing, the case was just dismissed for mootness after the
employees involved voted for a “one union representative” model. But apparently this issue
is not going away.
315. Bayless Educ. Ass’n v. Bayless Sch. Dist., No. 09SL-CC01481 (Cir. Ct. St. Louis
County Feb. 10, 2010).
316. Id. at *5.
317. Id. at *8.
318. Id. at *7–8.
319. Id. at *8.
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Bayless decision, the union on whose behalf I testified won a representation
election to represent these employees.
More broadly, this litigation, like the litigation described above involving the
DHS, raises the question of whether “collective bargaining” is a term of art with
some specific meaning, at least in the public sector. As noted above, the D.C.
Circuit in Chertoff held that it is.320 In that case, the court was dealing with the
statute authorizing the DHS, not the Missouri Constitution, and of course the D.C.
Circuit is not the Missouri Supreme Court. But in some important senses that case
and the Missouri cases are similar. In both instances, employees were granted a
right to bargain collectively; in neither instance did the authority granting that right
define “bargain collectively”; and in both cases, courts had to try to give meaning
to that term.
This is an especially interesting issue in the public sector, since “collective
bargaining” has a universal meaning on some, but not all, issues. As noted above,
state public-sector labor laws vary significantly on how bargaining impasses are
resolved and what topics unions may legally bargain about. 321 On the other hand,
public-sector labor laws have many fundamental rules in common with each other
(notably, using an exclusive majority representative chosen by the employees).
Indeed, the term “collective bargaining” in all U.S. labor laws throughout history
always meant some specific things, including exclusive, majority representation.
It is not yet clear how these issues in Missouri will be resolved. As of this
writing, the state legislature still has not clarified what precise rights public workers
have under the state constitution. Even if the state enacted a bargaining statute,
given that the right to collectively bargain is constitutionally protected, it is
possible that a court could find a statute providing certain rules did not, in fact,
provide “collective bargaining.” Most fundamentally, in the age of Obama,
seventy-five years after the passage of the NLRA and fifty years after the passage
of the first state law authorizing collective bargaining in the public sector, we see a
jurisdiction struggling with the meaning of the term “collective bargaining.”
CONCLUSION
The current period presents stark contrasts for public-sector unions. Union
density rates are high, yet the economic crisis has created a variety of threats:
budget cuts, to be sure, but also political threats in which public employees are
painted as an unfairly privileged class and long-standing rights to bargain
collectively are at risk. “The best of times, the worst of times” will not do, given
the growing tide of bad news for public-sector unions. But another old saying
comes to mind: “may you live in interesting times.” The phrase is often cited as an
old Chinese curse. While it may not be Chinese in origin, 322 the sense in which it is

320. See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text.
321. See supra Part I.D. Complicating the issue in the Missouri cases, though, is that
none of this diversity in public-sector law was present in 1945. See SLATER, supra note 4, at
ch. 3. Back then, there were no public sector labor laws, only private sector labor laws. Id.
Those laws had (and have) much less diversity in their rules. Id.
322. See May You Live in Interesting Times, PHRASE FINDER, http://www.phrases.org.uk/
meanings/may-you-live-in-interesting-times.html.
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a curse remains. For public sector labor, at least the first years of the age of Obama
have been unusually interesting times.
In my view, public-sector labor law as it has existed for decades has worked
well. State deficits are not caused by public-sector bargaining rights. As shown
above, multiple studies have demonstrated that, after adjusting for type of worker
and type of job, most public-sector workers are paid less than their private-sector
equivalents. While some public-sector pension funds have real funding problems,
these are not generally the fault of collective bargaining. This is true in large part
because in the vast majority of states, public-sector unions are not legally permitted
to negotiate over pension benefits. It is also true because other factors—notably the
stock market crash of 2008 and questionable actuarial assumptions—are the main
causes of the funding problems.
Thus, the radical and reactionary amendments to public-sector statutes some
states have adopted are unlikely to help government budgets. They will, however,
hurt working people and public services, and are also likely to dissuade talented
people from entering public service. These effects will, in turn, harm the public.
The attacks on collective bargaining are best understood as partisan politics—an
attempt to de-fund and cripple unions because they are a core constituency of the
Democratic Party. That is no justification for removing a longstanding, important
right for working men and women.

